FORUM NON CONVENIENS, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST
SUIT AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The traditional transitory cause of action 1 is no longer characterized by the
unqualified prerogative of the plaintiff to try his claim in any jurisdiction in
which process may be served on the defendant. Inroads on the power-of the
plaintiff to determine the forum for trial have developed in this century in the
form of two devices whereby the defendant may overcome the plaintiff's
choice of forum and relocate the place of trial in a state more conducive to
a full hearing of the evidence and more convenient to the litigants and witnesses. 2 The remedy initially available to the defendant lay in a suit in a sister
state to enjoin his adversary from proceeding in the forum alleged to be
objectionable.3 Upon the issuance of an injunction, the action would be
relocated in another jurisdiction :4(a) if the threat of contempt proceeding or
other enforcement techniques induced the opposing party to consent to a dismissal in the forum deemed objectionable,5 and (b) if the plaintiff chose to

I To say that a cause of action is transitory and not local is only tor say that it need not
be litigated in a particular forum. The local action, in contrast, must be tried in the jurisdiction in which the claim is thought to have arisen. Attempts have been made, however, to
relate the jurisdictional distinction with the substantive content of actions in each category.
In this sense, a transitory cause of action is one that might have arisen anywhere, while a
local action is one that could ariseonly in the jurisdiction in which it must be tried. The reasoning as to jurisdictional limitations seems to be this: an action which arises locally should
be sued upon locally; an action that could have arisen anywhere should be triable anywhere.
And thus, by the "nature" of a transitory action, the plaintiff has been thought to have a
right to determine the place of trial. See note 34, infra. See generally, Currie, The Constitution and the Transitory Cause of Action, 73 HARV. L. REv. 36 (1959); and particularly his
whimsical insight into the perplexities of defining the terms, id. at 66, n. 114.
2 Another limitation on the plaintiff's option to determine the forum is the constitutional
restraint against imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Denver &
R.G.W. R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492
(1929); Davis v. Farmers' Co-op Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
3 Injunctions against suits in sister states were used originally to prevent circumvention
by state residents of insolvency and debtors' exemption of other residents. E.g., Allen v.
Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, 11 So. 777 (1892); Wilson v. Joseph, 107 Ind.490,8 N.E. 616 (1886);
Hawkins v. Ireland, 64 Minn. 339, 67 N.W. 73 (1896).
4In contrast to the informal two-step process of transference between separate states,
transference in the Federal courts may be effected by motion in the forum initially selected.
The statutory basis for the remedy, 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958), provides:
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
5
One technique is to enjoin witnesses from participation in the action so long as it is
located in the forum deemed inappropriate; see Peterson v. Chicago B. & 0. R.R., 187
Minn. 228, 244 N.W. 823 (1932). Another device, if the court has a particular relation to the
res of the controversy, is to threaten nonaccess to the forum and thus to satisfaction of a
foreign judgment as long as the enjoined party acts in violation of injunction. See Wehrhane
v. Peyton, 134 Conn. 486, 58 A.2d 699 (1948). If the defendant appears before the court as
the trustee of a res located in the jurisdiction, the court may threaten to remove him from
that capacity if he should violate the injunction. Doerr v. Warner, 247 Minn. 98, 76 N.W.2d
505 (1956).
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initiate his claim in a forum permitted by the terms of the injunction. 6 The
second step, initiation of the suit in the more suitable forum, causes duplication of the preliminary stages of the litigation; for a second time, the complaint must be filed and process must be served on the defendant. Owing in
part to this duplication, transfers are thought advisable only when the in7
crease in convenience is substantial.
In theory, the number of forums to which an action may be transferred
by use of the injunction includes all those that might be more suitable than
the forum initially chosen by the plaintiff. Traditionally, actions have been
transferred only to the enjoining forum, and thus, only to a jurisdiction in
which process may be served on the plaintiff-the party to be enjoined. An
additional convention tends further to narrow the range of acceptable forums.
Generally, the state selected for an injunction suit is the state in which the
claim has arisen. As a result, in tort litigation, a transfer by use of the injunction has served to guarantee application of the lex loci in the adjudication of
the claim.
Adopted more recently by several American jurisdictionss as a second
method by which to remedy an inappropriate choice of forum, the doctrine
of forum non conveniens enables the defendant to initiate relocation of the
action in a more suitable jurisdiction by moving for dismissal in a forum
selected by the plaintiff. 9 As in injunctive relief, the transfer between jurisdictions is completed when the plaintiff commences his action in a forum more
suitable for trial. 10 The forum that grants a dismissal on the grounds of
6 The terms of the injunction may permit resumption of suit in a forum other than the
one issuing the injunction. See Southern Ry. v. Painter, 314 U.S. 155 (1941).
7 For other considerations influencing the level of inconvenience requisite for injunctive
relief, see text accompanying notes 32-34, infra. See also note 10, infra. In transfers within
the federal system, the action need not be recommenced in the transferee forum. 62 Stat. 937
(1948), 28 U.S.C. 1404 (a); see note 4, supra. The level of inconvenience necessary for a dismissal reflects the fact that the action is not dismissed and that recommencement is not
required. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
8 Of the populous states, Missouri, Texas, and Ohio have not yet adopted the doctrine
of forum non conveniens. See generally the appendix to Lansvek v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp., 54 Wash. 2d 774, 338 P.2d 747 (1959). For an analysis of the reasons why states do
not accept the doctrine, see note 45, infra.
9 The history of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and its absorption into American
practice has been well documented in the periodical literature. Barrett, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. Rav. 380 (1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens ii Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. Rav. I (1929); Braucher, The Inconvenient
FederalForum, 60 HARV. L. REV. 908 (1947); Dainow, The InappropriateForum, 29 ILL. L
REV. 867 (1935); Foster, Place of Trial-InterstateApplication of Intrastate Methods of
Adjustment, 44 HARv. L. REV. 41 (1930).
10 As in the use of the injunction, the increment of inconvenience must be substantial.
"[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). Cf. text at
note 42, infra. See note 7, supra.
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forum non conveniens may cause the action to be transferred to a particular
jurisdiction by conditioning the dismissal on a stipulation by the defendant to
submit to suit in the forum deemed by the dismissing court to be most
desirable."
Thus, under both remedies, relocation of the place of trial occurs in four
stages: (1) the granting of relief; (2) discontinuance of the action in the
original forum;12 (3) commencement of suit in the forum preferred by the
defendant; (4) retention of jurisdiction by the preferred forum.
In the use of either remedy, a risk of failure occurs at only one step in the
process. When a forum non conveniens dismissal is the method selected, the
fourth stage is critical, for the forum to which the action is directed need not
11 The condition of the dismissal isually appears as a stipulation by defendant that if the
plaintiff commences the action in the preferred forum, defendant will enter an appearance
and will not plead the statute of limitations. Vargas v. A. H. Bull Steamship Co., 44 N.J.
Super. 536, 131 A.2d 39 (1957), affd 25 N.J. 293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957) (payment of plaintiff's
attorney fees in the dismissing forum interpreted as a condition for transference); Winter
v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 740,212 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1961); Ginsburg v.
Hearst Publishing Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 200, 170 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1958); Rodriguez v. A. H.
Buff Steamship Co., 286.App. Div. 207, 143 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1955); Ivy v. Stoddard, 147
N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Declining jurisdiction in Gore v. United States Steel Corp.,
15 N.J. 301, 104 A.2d 670 (1954), the court warned the defendant that a failure to comply
with-the conditions of the dismissal would remove any bars to a subsequent suit in New
Jersey.
When local limitations prevent or threaten to prevent continuation of the action in a
more suitable jurisdiction and the forum would not permit defendant to waive his defense
of the statute of limitations, motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens
have been denied. Peterie v. Thompson, 10 111. App. 2d 100, 134 N.E.2d 534 (1956); Taylor
v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 309 N.Y. 633, 152 N.E.2d 878 (1958); Randle v. Inecto,
131 Misc. 261,226 N.Y. Supp. 686 (Sup. Ct. 1928). But cf. Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954). Dismissals may be granted in the absence of a special stipulation by the defendant, e.g.
Elliot v. Johnson, 365 Mo. 881, 292 S.W.2d 589 (1956); Gainer v. Donner, 140 Misc. 841,
251 N.Y. Supp. 713 (Sup. Ct. 1931), but not without proof of the availability of a more suitable forum. City Farmers Trust Co. v. National Cuba Hotel Corp., 133 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup
Ct. 1954); cf. Bagarozy v. Meneghini, 8 111. App.2d 285, 131 N.E.2d 792 (1955). Generally,
access to alternative forums in the United States will be assumed unless contested by the
plaintiff. Elliot v. Johnson, supra; Gainer v. Donner, supra. The concept of the alternative
forum was limited in Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 252 Minn. 165, 89 N.W.2d
654 (1958), to the class ofjurisdictions in which the plaintiff in initially filing his action could
have served process on the defendant. Thus the unamenability of the defendant corporation
to service of process precluded a dismissal despite the defendant's willingness to stipulate as
to appearance. For an instance of transference to a jurisdiction in which the defendant
could not have been served with process, see Vargas v. A. H. Bull Steamship Co., supra.On
this issue, practice in the federal system is determined by the language of 28 U.S.C. 1404(a):
the action may be transferred only to those jurisdictions "where it might have been brought."
This condition has been interpreted in conformity with the limitation on the use of forum
non conveniens imposed by Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., supra. Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
12 A note on terminology: the "original forum" will consistently refer to the forum chosen
by the plaintiff; the "enjoining forum" is the forum issuing the injunction; "plaintiff" and
"defendant," even in discussions of the injunction suit, will refer to the parties as they are
aligned in the substantive controversy.
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retain jurisdiction if it disagrees with the decision of the original forum. When
injunctive relief is sought in a sister state, however, the granting of an injunction expresses that forum's willingness to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim. The
critical stage in injunctive relief occurs at the second stage, that of forcing the
discontinuance of the proceedings in the forum in which the action was
originally brought. Enforcement techniques are limited. The enjoining forum

may threaten contempt proceedings against the plaintiff, enjoin witness, or
use other methods of intimidation; but it may not directly restrain the original
forum from hearing the case. 13 The forum in which the action is pending need
not recognize the enjoining forum's attempted restraint of the plaintiff.1a

Indeed, it may issue a counter-injunction to protect its jurisdiction.' 5 Against
nonresidents, enforcement by contempt proceedings is complicated by possible difficulties in obtaining personal jurisdiction over the recalcitrant party.
As a result of these difficulties, the plaintiff's action may proceed despite the

injunction.

6
If the Supreme Court were to interpret the full faith and credit clause1 to
impose on the original forum the duty to recognize the injunction and on that

13 Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn. 419 (1877); Askew v. Bassett Furniture Co., 172 Ga.
700, 158 S.E. 577 (1931); Touchstone v. Moore, 227 Miss. 415, 86 So.2d 352 (1956). But cf.
Lyle v. Collier, 62 S.W.2d 1112 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1933) (bias on the part of the judge was
thought to create a defeat in jurisdiction; and thus, the injunction was permitted.)
14 Though a few courts have dismissed actions in voluntary deference to sister-state injunctions, Allen v. Chicago G.W.A.R., 239 Il1.App. 38 (1925); Fisher v. Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (1916), a substantial number of cases manifest total disregard for the enforcement of sister-state injunctions against suit. Frye v. Chicago R.I. & P.
Ry., 157 Minn. 52, 195 N.W. 629 (1923); Union Pac. R.R. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 193
N.W. 161 (1923); State ex rel. Bosscung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N.W. 589
(1918); Kepner v. Cleveland, C. & St. L. Ry., 322 Mo. 299, 15 S.W.2d 825 (1929).
In an important early case, Gilman v. Ketcham, 84 Wis. 60,54 N.W. 395 (1893), recognition on the basis of comity was extended to a sister-state injunction.
The issue of the injunction suit, however, was not the degree of trial inconvenience; the
question was solely whether the enjoined party had evaded the insolvency policies of his
home state. Since the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not applicable, the injunction
did not supersede an alternative remedy in the original forum. Thus, the forum, by recognizing the injunction and dismissing the action, did not abdicate its capacity to decide the
issue adjudicated in the injunction suit. Compare James v. Grand Trunk R.R., 14 IIl. 2d
356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958), in which the Illinois court enjoined the enforcement of a Wisconsin injunction against suit in Illinois; an important consideration in the decision was the
failure of the defendant to avail himself of the forum non conveniens remedy in Illinois.
For an argument in favor of full faith and credit recognition of injunctions against suit,
see Comment, 26 U. Ci. L. REv. 633 (1959). See also Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 620 (1954). See generally, Reese, Full Faith and
Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IowA L. Rlv. 183 (1957).
15 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (8th Cir. 1923); James v. Grand
Trunk R.R., 14 1l1.2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958); Peterson v. Chicago, B. & 0. Ry., 187
Minn. 228, 224 N.W. 823 (1932).
16 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State...."
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basis to dismiss the action,17 the risk of failure in the transfer of actions by
injunction would be substantially reduced. After an injunction issued, progression through the remaining three stages of the process would be assured.
The original forum would be compelled to dismiss; the plaintiff would be
required to bring his action, if at all, in the enjoining forum; and the enjoining
forum would retain jurisdiction. To determine whether this increase in effectiveness warrants the extension of full faith and credit recognition to injunctions against suit, the precise operation of the two remedies must be examined,
both as presently administered and as they would be administered were the
proposed change to take place.
Under 'present practice, variations in the operation of the two remedies
may be found in three areas: (1) the basic prerequisites for relief, (2) the role
of factors used to determine the relative convenience of the alternative
forums, and (3) the influence of interests local to the forum from which

relief is sought.
I
To secure relief under either remedy, basic .rules must be satisfied. These
rules focus on the residence of the litigants and, in the case of injunctive relief,
on the motive of the plaintiff in choosing the allegedly objectionable forum.
By imposing residence limitations, the courts have narrowed the extent to
which the dev~ice of forum non conveniens may be used. Residence of the
plaintiff in the state in which the original action is pending almost always
precludes a forum non conveniens dismissal;l8 but this same fact will not bar
17 When injunctions aginst suit have been recognized on a comity basis, the manner of
enforcement has been dismissal of the action. Allen v. Chicago, Great W. R.R., 239 111.
App. 38 (1925); Fisher v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (1916).
Thus, recognition by an original forum of an injunction against an action pending therein
leads to a means of enforcement not available in the forum in which the injunction was
issued.
Is De la Bouillerie v. de Viene, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949); Gregonis v. P. & K.
Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1925); Catugno v. Union Pac. R.R.; 12 Misc.
2d 255, 177 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Chapman v. Southern Ry., 230 S.C. 210, 95
S.E.2d 170 (1956) (dictum); but cf. Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104
A.2d 670 (1954)(dictum).
Plaintiff's residence in the state at the time he initiates the action though not at the time
when the claim accrued has been held sufficient to bar a dismissal. Bullock v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, 7 Misc. 2d 108, 162 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1957). But cf. Missouri, K.T.R.R. v.
District Court Old., 294 P.2d 579 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1956).
The residence, however, of a plaintiff suing on a derivative claim does not preclude dismissal. Koster v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). Similarly, a resident administrator has been held not to be immune to dismissal. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
District Court, 298 P.2d 427 (Okla., Sup. Ct. 1956). Massachusetts and New York differ as
to the status of a resident assignee. Compare Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank,'
Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933) with Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 App. Div. 2d 56-1
173 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1958).
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the issuance of an injunction by a sister forum) 9 This divergence in policy
toward a plaintiff suing in his home forum appears to derive from the
inability of the dismissing forum to enforce its determination that the trial
should take place in a particular alternative forum' If a plaintiff were unable
to sue in his home forum, and if sister-state forums rigidly applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss suits brought by nonresidents, a
20
plaintiff might find himself without a forum in which to litigate his claim.
Since the category of "residents" includes both natural persons and domestic corporations, generalizations cannot readily be made as to the evidentiary
value of a party's residence on the issue of trial convenience. In weighing the
effect of the defendant's residence in the state of suit, the two categories of
residents should be treated separately. It may be assumed that a natural person generally would not be inconvenienced if he should be sued in the state of
his residence. 21 On the other hand, a domestic corporation conducting a na-

tion-Avide business might not regard the state of its legal residence as an especially attractive place for trial. Disregarding the distinction between categories
of residents, the New York courts refuse categorically to dismiss actions
brought against residents, both natural and corporate. 22 Other states have
expressly rejected the New York rule. 23 In Winsor v. UnitedAirlines,24 despite
19 Grover v. Wood%.ard, 91 N.J. Eq. 250, 109 Atl. 822 (1920) (dictum). Generally, residence of the plaintiff is of significance in injunctive relief only as a factor bearing on the
relative comenience of alternative forums. Non-residence of the plaintiff in the enjoining
states does not bar relief. Wehrhane v. Peyton, 134 Conn. 486, 58 A.2d 698 (1948); Receivers
of Middlesex Banking Co. v. Realty Inv. Co., 104 Conn. 206, 132 Atl. 390 (1926); Doerr v.
Warner. 247 Minn. 98, 76 N.W.2d 505 (1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 801 (1956). But cf.Greer
v. Cook. 88 Ark. 93, 113 S.W. 1009 (1908); Carpenter, Baggott & Co. v. Hanes, 162 N.C.
46, 77 S.E. 1101 (1913).
.-o Distinguishing between residents and nonresidents in regulating the use of forum non
con'eniens is consistent with the constitutional command (Article IV, § 2)that "Citizens
of each state shall be entitled to all the Privileges and Immunities of citizens in the several
states." Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). Discrimination against
nonresident plaintiffs is regarded as an acceptable expression of state interest. "There are
manifest reasons for preferring residents in access to often-overcrowded Courts, both in
convenience and in the fact that broadly speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the
Courts concerned.*' 279 U.S. at 387.
Frequently, concern for the interests of taxpayers is raised to justify policies of dismissing
actions initiated by nonresidents. See, e.g., Price v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 42 Cal. 2d 577,
268 P.2d 457 (1954); Peterie v. Thomson, 10 I11.App.2d 100, 134 N.E.2d 534 (1956).
21 See State of Oklahoma ex rel Oklahoma Tax Commission v. H. D. Lee Co., 174 Kan.
114, 254 P.2d 291 (1953).
22 De la Bouillerie v. de Viene, 300 N.Y. 60, 80 N.E.2d 15 (1949); Vigil v. Cayuga
Const. Corp., 185 Misc.2d 680, 58 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
-"The courts of New Jersey and Delaware have dismissed actions on behalf of domestic
corporations. Winsor v. United Airlines, 154 A.2d 561 (Del. Super. Ct. 1958); Gore v.
United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 2d 391, 104 A.2d 670 (1954). In both decisions, the courts
expressed disapproval of the inflexibility of the New York policy.
24 154 A.2d 561 (Del. Super. Ct. 1958).
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the status of.the defendant as a Delaware corporation, the Delaware court
dismissed the action in deference to the courts of Colorado. Offsetting whatever convenience might have been incident to the defendant's legal residence
in Delaware, trial in Colorado offered numerous concrete advantages. As a
result of the relocation of the trial, witnesses were more readily available to
testify, proof was more accessible, and .the expense of the trial was
minimized. 2 5
In Poole v. Mississippi PublishersCorp.,26 a case decided prior to the announcement in Winsor that Delaware courts would under appropriate cir-

cumstances dismiss actions brought against domestic corporations, the defendant corporation advisedly selected the alternative remedy: a suit for injunctive relief in the state preferred-for trial.27 On facts substantially similar
28
to those in Winsor, the injunction was issued.
In the Poole case, however, an essential element in the defendant's prayer

for injunctive relief was the assertion that the "suit in Delaware ... constitute[d] a fraud... [since it was] not... filed in good faith but purely as a
29
means of compelling the complainant to settle with the defendants ....
The Poole case thus illustrates the general rule that proof of the plaintiff's
30
improper motive is a necesiary condition for the issuance of an injunction.
25
See the detailed listing by the court of the factors favoring Colorado as the most
suitable place for trial, 154 A.2d at 564.
26 208 Miss. 364, 44 So.2d 467 (1950)

27 For other instances of injunctions against suits in sister states granted on behalf of
nonresidents, see Wehrhane v. Peyton, 134 Conn. 486; 58 A.2d 698 (1948); Danzies v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 N.Y. 564, 13 N.E.2d 475 (1938); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Richey & Gilbert, 132 Wash. 526, 232 Pac. 355 (1925). Two earlier cases holding to the contrary, Folkes v. Central of Georgia Ry., 202 Ala. 376, 80 So. 458 (1918), and American
Express Co. v. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489, 187 S.W. 1117 (1916), were criticized in Northern Pac.
Ry. y. Richey & Gilbert, supra.
28 For detailed allegations- of the relative convenience of trial in Mississippi, see 208
Miss. at 372-73, 44 So.2d at 469-70:
29 208 Miss. at 373, 44 So.2d at 470.
30 When injunctive relief is denied, the ground usually offered is the absence of improperly motivated conduct on the part of the plaintiff. E.g., Bavuso v. Angwin, 166 Kan. 469,
201 P.2d 1057 (1949); Bank Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 122 Kan. 831, 253 Pac. 431
(1927); New Orleans Brewing Co. v. Cahall, 188 La. 749, 178 So. 339 (1937); Southern Pac.
Ry. v. Baum, 39 N.M. 22, 38 P.2d 1106 (1934). In Missouri K.T.R.R. v. Ball, 126 Kan.
745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928), the court justified its refusal to grant injunctive relief on the
specific ground that: "Nothing was shown about the motive of the [plaintiff] in bringing the
action'in Missouri, and no attempt was made to prove that she was actuated by fraud or a
purpose to oppress or to gain an inequitable advantage of the railroad company or to
harrass or to annoy that company." 126 Kan. at 748, 271 Pac. at 314.
Disregarding theprecedents of other jurisdictions, the Indiana courts have issued injunctions against residents suing out-of-state without demanding a demonstration of improper
motive. The out-of-state actions were based on claims arising under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65-66 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958). Kern v. Cleveland, C.C. &
St. L Ry. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170 N.E. 328 (1930)..
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This requirement, which is not part of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 31

may have arisen from judicial concern about the disruptive effect of injunctions against suit on interstate relations. 32 To minimize the overtones of

interference in official functions of the sister forum, enjoining forums have
emphasized the principle that the injunction restrains the plaintiff and not the
sister-state court and, consequently, have focused upon the plaintiff's motive
rather than upon the propriety of the original forum's retaining jurisdiction.33

The rule might also have derived in part from the high regard shown by
many of the earlier courts for the plaintiff's right to select the forum for trial.
By conditioning relief on the plaintiff's wrongful conduct, the courts were able
to justify the limitation on his freedom to choose the forum for trial.34
The lack, however, of a direct relationship between plaintiff's motive in
selecting the original forum and the desirability of transfer to a more convenient forum has affected the stringency with which the improper motive
must be proved. In the Poole case, for example, the defendant was not require to~prove facts pertaining exclusively to the plaintiff's subjective intent
in selecting the original forum. The inference that plaintiff's motive was to
extort a favorable settlement was based primarily on the degree of expense

and inconvenience imposed upon the defendant as a result of the plaintiff's
choice of forum. 35 When an enjoining court permits an inference of improper
motive from the effect of the place of trial on the defendant's convenience, the

factual conditions for transference by injunction become identical with the
criteria for a forum non conveniens dismissal.36
.1 In applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, courts typically do not advert to
the problem of plaintiff's motive. See cases cited notes 12,17, 18, supra. Some decisions, however, have referred to the notions of harrassment and vexation. Continental Casualty Co.
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 28 111. App.2d 177, 171 N.E. 2d 68(1960) (criticizing a motion to dismiss for not including an allegation of harrassment); Starr v. Berry, 25 NJ. 2d
573, 138 A.2d 44 (1958) (associating harrassment with hardship and looking to hardship as
the criterion for dismissal). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
32
See, e.g., Durrantv. Pierson, 12 N.Y. Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Mead v. Merritt, 2
Paige 402 (N.Y. 1831).
- See, e.g., Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890); Hyafill v. Buffalo Marine Co.,
266 Fed. 533 (W.D.N.Y. 1919); Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Loring, 217 Iowa 534, 250 N.W. 8
(1933).
.4 The "right- of the plaintiff to select the jurisdiction for trial was eloquently appraised
by Chancellor Pitney in Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 457, 71 Atil. 153
(1908); "[Equity will not interfere with the right of any person to bring an action for the
redress of grievances-the right preservative of all rights--except for grave reasons...."
74 N.J. Eq. at 473, 71 At. at 160. In Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Halchak, 71 F. Supp. 224
(W.D. Pa. 1947), the court, denying the prayer for injunctive relief, referred to the "undeniable right of the resident of one state to go into the courts of another state and secure such
relief as there may be available to him ....
71 F. Supp. at 228.
35 The court approved the use of evidence of trial inconvenience in establishing the
impropriety of the plaintiff's mothe. 208 Miss. at 376, 44 So.2d at 471.
36 Although acknowledging the doctrinal requirement of improper purpose, the court in
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Richey & Gilbert Co., 132 Wash. 526, 232 Pac. 355 (1925), issued an
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An alternative method for softening the improper motive requirement lies
in the ambiguity of many of the formulas used to express the requirement. If
it is said that an injunction will issue to avoid "fraud, gross wrong, or oppression," 37 the latter two criteria may refer either to the plaintiff's conduct in
choosing the forum or to the consequences of that choice on the defendant's

convenience. The plaintiff's motive may be to oppress or he may unwittingly
create circumstances in fact oppressive. With formulas of such ambiguity, an
enjoining court is free to require distinct proof of improper motive or to
employ an analysis the same as that used on a motion to dismiss for forum
38
non conveniens.
II
In addition to these variations in the basic rules for relief, differences between the two remedies arise in the application of the factors of trial convenience. According to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the formal basis
for the decision is the relative suitability of the competing forums. The exclusive ground for relief is the finding by the court of a degree of relative inconvenience deemed sufficient to warrant transfer. With the alternative remedy,

transfer by injunction, the formal basis for relief is the impropriety of the
plaintiff's motive in selecting the original forum. An injunction will issue on
proof of trial, inconvenience sufficient to give rise to an inference that the

choice of forum was improperly motivated; yet the injunction may also issue
without proof of trial inconvenience in the ordinary sense. An improperly

motivated plaintiff may inititate a suit and yet not create conditions that
would support a motion for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens.
injunction on considerations solely of inconvenience and expense. Showing regard for the
doctrinal requirement, thi Court concluded that "the facts in this case show there is some
appearance of vexation .. " 132 Wash. at 533, 232 Pac. at 358.
In Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel Co., 71 N.J. Eq. 61, 63 Atl. 546 (1906),
the court enjoined.the prosecutions of plaintiff's claim on distinct attachments in three Midwestern states. Refuting the plaintiff's protestations of good faith, the court regarded the
factual circumstances as conclusion of the plaintiff's motivation: "That the use of attachments, having [the] ..obvious result [of harrassing and oppressing the plaintiff] was not
intended to produce the result, is not within the range of belief." 71 N.J. Eq. at 65, 63 Atl.
at 547-48;.
For a criticism of the dangers inhering in facile inferences at to the plaintiff's motive, see
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Harden, 158 La. 889, 105 So. 2 (1925).
37 This particular phrase was employed in Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 In.383,
387,115 N.E. 554,556 (1917). Analogous expression of the criterion for relief may be found,
for example, in Payne v. Knapp, 197 Iowa 737, 743, 198 N.W. 62, 64 (1924) ("fraud, undue
hardship, or oppression"); Bavuso v. Angwin, 166 Kan. 469, 201 P.2d 1057 (1940); Keisker
v. Bush, 210 Ky. 718,722,276 S.W. 815,816 (1925) ("unfair or unconscionable advantage").
38 The Iowa courts have interpreted "vexatious litigation" to be a concept of consequences, not of purpose. A passage from Wabash Ry. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N.W.
523.(1919), quoted in Bankers Life Co. v. Loring, 217 Iowa 534, 542,250 N.W. 8, 12 (1933),
pinpoints this line of interpretation: Without reference to actual intention, there is no escaping from the conclusion that on the facts at bar the suit is an instance of vexatious litigation
such as is condemned by the quite general consensus of authority. (Emphasis added).
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If, as in Mason v. Harlow,3 the defendant were engaged in prosecuting a dif-

ferent claim against the plaintiff in a nearby state, the inconvenience to the
defendant in being forced to litigate in two forums would not involve the
usual forum non conveniens considerations--expensb, distance, availability of
witnesses, etc. A dismissal would require an unusual application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The defendant could, however, readily obtain
injunctive relief on satisfactory proof that the plaintiff's motive was to hinder
the defendant in the prosecution of his action in the neighboring state.
III
Occasionlly, injunctions are issued without regard either for the criteria of
trial convenience or the propriety of the plaintiff's motive, but rather to pro-

mote interests local to the enjoining forum. Some courts, for example, have
sought to prevent the "exportation" of particular classes of claims arising

within the state;40 others have issued injunctions in order to guarantee the
application of local law to controversies based on domestic incidents. 41
Similarly, in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the forum's
interest in relieving court congestion often affects its determination of the
desirability of transferring an action to another jurisdiction. 4 2 In all border39 84 Kan. 277, 114 Pac. 218 (1911); cf.Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel
Co., 71 N.J. Eq. 61, 63 AtI. 546 (1906).
40 Nonexportation policies have been pursued in deference to venue statutes locating
actions against railroads in specified counties within the state. Pere Marquette Ry. v. Slutz,
268 Mich. 388, 256 N.W. 458 (1934); New York, C. & St. L. Ry v. Matzinger, 136 Ohio St.
271, 25 N.E. 2d 349 (1940). Both statutes involved, however, referred to actions intended to
be initiated within the state.
In Wabash Ry. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N.W. 523 (1919), the court reasoned that
the prevention of exportation of domestic claims was part of the state's public policy. Supporting the conclusion was a statute declaring it to be unlawful to solicit claims for prosecution outside of the state.
41 Differing forum law in negligence cases has prompted the forum with the rule more
advantageous to the defendant to enjoin the prosecution of the action in a sister forum.
Weaver v. Alabama Great So. Ry., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917); Sanders v. Yates, 215
Ga. 218, 109 S.E.2d 739 (1959). In Culp v. Butler, 69 Ind. App. 668, 122 N.E. 684 (1919),
the out-of-state action xas enjoined because the statute of limitations had run in the enjoining forum-the state in which the claim had arisen and in which the plaintiff resided. But
ef. Royal League v. Kavanagh, 233 II1. 175, 84 N.E. 178 (1908), in which the injunction was
denied in deference to the choice-of-law policy of the sister forum.
4Z References to the forum's interest in relieving court congestion are ubiquitous. See,
e.g., Cotton v. Louisville & N.R.R., 14 111. 2d 144, 152 N.E.2d 385 (1958); Universal
Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933); St. Louis,
S.F. Ry. v. Superior Court, 276 P.2d 773 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1954).
For a vigorous discussion of the relevance of congestion in the forums to which transference might be directed, see the opinions of the court and of Pratt, C. J., dissenting in
Mooney v. Denver 118 Utah 300, 221 P.2d 628 (1950).
Authority is divided upon the manner in which court congestion should influence forum
non conveniens policy. The firm position of Anderson v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 18 N.J.
Misc. 153, 11 A.2d 607 (Cir. Ct. 1940), is that court congestion is a factor relevant to the
desirability of a forum non conveniens policy, but not relevant to deciding the advisability
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line situations, the likelihood of dismissal increases with the desire of the
forum to reduce the burden on its docket. To implement a policy of reducing
congestion, the court may lower the degree of inconvenience that the defendant must prove, or it may even shift to non-resident plaintiffs the duty of jus43
tifying the retention of jurisdiction.
The forum's local interests tend to benefit the defendant in a variety of
'ways. If a forum issues an injunction to secure application of its own law to
a claim arising within the state, the defendant is given the opportunity to
obtain relief whenever the sister forum refuses to apply the lex loci in deciding
the case. Consequently, the local policy of the enjoining forum adds a new
basis for relief. In contrast to this relatively specialized application, a forum
policy designed to reduce congestion in its courts increases the likelihood of
a forum non conveniens dismissal in every case. in which the appropriateness
of the forum can reasonably be questioned.
Thus, the more advantageous remedy in a particular situation will depend
in part on the local policies of the forums from which relief might b obtained. A forum non conveniens motion is advisable if the forum in which the
action is pending wishes to assure, as do most metropolitan courts, that the
amount of litigation will be minimized. Analogously, a suit for an injunction
is likely to be successful if the courts in the state in which the claims have
arisen follow a policy of preventing the "expoftation" of domestic actions.
Although local interests may render relief under one remedy more likely than
under the alternative, the more desirable method of obtaining a transfer need
not be the only method; failure under one remedy does not preclude recourse
to the other.
But a choice between the two remedies is not always available. The doctrine-of forum non conveniens cannot be invoked in every situation in which a
relocation of the action would be desirable. Many states reject the doctrine
'entirely; and of those in which it is applied, relief.is unlikely if either party is
a resident of the forum state. When transfer is blocked for these reasons, the
inconvenienced defendant may seek an injunction against the plaintiff's proceeding in his chosen forum. By use of the injunction, a transfer may be obtained from any jurisdiction, but owing to the difficulties of enforcing injuncof transference in a particular. case. But cf.Ramsey v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 247 Minn.
217, 77 N.W. 2d 176 (1956) (dissenting opinion) in which it was decided that F.E.L.A.
claims, as a major burden on the docket, should be dismissed more readily than other
actions.
Contrary to the assumptions of jurisdiotions favoring forum non conveniens as an instrument of docket control, one court has argued that dismissing claims may actually increase
litigation in the jurisdiction by virtue of appeals filed by plaintiffs seeking to reverse the
dismissal of these claims. Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wash. 2d 174, 338
P.2d 747 (1959).
43
Generally the burden ofjustifying dismissal is on thedefendant. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Running v. Southwest Freight Lines Inc., 227 Ark. 839,303 S.W.
2d 578 (1957).
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tions under present practice, the injunction dere is not a fully effective
alternative to a forum non conveniens dismissal,44
The difficulties of enforcing injunctions against suit would disappear if the
full faith and credit clause were interpreted to require recognition of the
injunction in the original forum: the original forum would be constitutionally compelled to dismiss the action; it could neither refuse to enforce nor
enjoin the enforcement of the injunction. With the assurance that an injunction decree would be recognized by the original forum, the defendant could
effectively transfer a suit from any jurisdiction-including those that do not
now apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Overcoming another limitation on the transfer of suits by forum non conveniens, a defendant could
secure transfer both as a resident and against residents of the forum state. By
superseding individual state policies restricting the use of forum non conveniens, the extension of full faith and credit recognition to injunctions
against suit would create an effective nation-wide method for relieving defendants from undue trial inconvenience.
The distinguishing characteristic of a system in which injunctions against
suit were accorded full faith and credit would be the capacity of an enjoining
forum to compel a dismissal in the original jurisdiction. With this power, a
forum could more effectively relocate an action in the interest of convenience.
Moreover, it could more effectively implement local-policies independent of
sparing expense and inconvenience to the parties. For example, when assured
of recognition, an injunction would be a more usef i way to prevent sister
forums from making choice-of-law decisions which ignore the relevant connections of the enjoining forum to the action. If a siste forum indiscriminately
applies its own law in an action which is between residents of the enjoining
state and which is almost wholly unrelated to the forum in which it is pend44 A significant advantage of an injunction suit is the appcabity of the denial of relief.
In forum non conveniens practice, only two jurisdictions-mIw Jersey and New Yorkpermit direct appeals from a refusal to dismiss. Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 NJ.
301, 104 A.2d 670 (1954); Williams v. Seaboard Air Line RJF, 9 App. Div. 2d 268, 193
N.Y.S. 2d 588 (1959); Rodriguez v. A. H. Bull Steamship Co., 268 App. Div. 207, 143
N.Y.S. 2d 618 (1955).
However, in jurisdictions which do not permit such interlotory appeals, appeal from

a denial to dismiss must be taken after trial, verdict and judgment. In this situation, little
can be said on appeal as to the advisability of a transferene fWithe purpose of trial convenience. Indicating perhaps that a trial cures all abuses of dixetion in not dismissing, no
recorded case stands for a reversal after a judgment for the pty having initially selected
the forum-the plaintiff. Cases affirming a denial to dismiss aremumerous. See, e.g., Cotton
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 14 l. 2d 144, 152 N.E.2d 385 (1958); Homer v. Pleasant Creek

Mining Corp., 165 Ore. 683, 107 P.2d 989 (1940).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has permitted the use of th ext raordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition to review denials of motions to dism. St. Louis, S.F. Ry. v. Superior Court, 290 P.2d 118 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1955) (mandamus held available against an arbi-

trary abuse of discretion); St. Louis, S.F. Ry. v. Superior Court, 276 P.2d 773 (Okla Sup.
Ct. 1954) (writ of prohibition issued where the trial judge believed he had no authority to

enter a dismissal). Over a strong dissent by Justice Schaefer, the Illinois Supreme Court
refused to sanction the use of extraordinary writs to correct an exercise of discretion, however abusive. Cotton v. Louisville & N.R.R., 14 111. 2d 144, 152 N.E.2d 385 (1957).
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ing, the enjoining forum could override the choice-of-law decision of the
sister forum by using.the injunction to acquire jurisdiction over the action.
It is doubtful, however, whether an enjoining forum could systematically use
injunctions to prevent litigation in sister forums of all action in which it
claimed a state interest. By analogy to the denial of full faith and credit recognition to state statutes proscribing the exportation of domestic claims, the
nondiscretionary issuance of injunctions to achieve a similar purpose would
fail to create an obligation in sister forums to recognize the decrees.
As a consequence of full faith and credit recognition of injunctions and the
equality of power between the enjoining forum and the original forum to relocate the action, an accommodation of the two remedies would be necessary
to avoid inconsistent decisions on the advisability of granting relief. The need
for acommodation would be limited to the circumstance of a denial of relief
under one remedy prior to the granting of a transfer under the alternative
remedy; for relief under either remedy would prompt a relocation of the
action, rendering moot the possibility of recourse to the alternative method
of transfer.
To avoid the circumstance of relief in one forum conflicting directly with a
prior decision of another forum not to permit a transfer, the participating
forums might invoke the principal of collateral estoppel. After the defendant
unsuccessfully sought relief by one remedy, alternative forums would consider him estopped from relitigating issues already adjudicated. Issues decided on a forum non conveniens denial could not be raised anew in an injunction
suit, and adjudications of issues by a denial of injunctive relief would similarly
be binding on the original forum. In the use of each remedy, however, the
issue adjudicated may be defined with varying decrees of specificity. On a
motion for a forum non conveniens dismissal, the issue may be thought to be
whether the action should be transferred, whether it should be transferred on
the ground of inconvenience, or whether it should be transferred on the basis
of the type of inconvenience present in the particular case. Similarly, the issue
in a suit for an injunction may be defined broadly or narrowly. Thus, even if
a forum is amenable to extending collateral estoppel protection to a plaintiff
who has withstood one attempt by his adversary to transfer the action, an
appropriate characterization of the issue decided in the sister forum would
leave the forum free to exercise its discretion to grant relief. To the extent that
the issues were defined narrowly, relief could be permitted after an unsuccessful attempt to transfer by the alternative means. In particular, to the extent
that forums were willing to issue injunctions over a previous denial to dismiss
by the original forum, the original forum would be deprived of the capacity
to effectuate a policy of retaining jurisdiction over specified claims. Since the
required recognition of injunctions would not affect the prerogative of an
enjoining forum to define its own policy toward forum non conveniens decisions of the original forum, the extent to which injunctions would issue over
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forum non conveniens denials would depend solely on the policy of the
enjoining forum.
If a nation-wide system of transfer is to be based on the command of full
faith and credit, the medium of locating actions in the most convenient
forums will be the control of enjoining forums over the jurisdiction of original
forums. Yet this medium is the primary disadvantage of the proposed change.
Forums subject to the duty to recognize sister forum injunctions would substantially be deprived of jurisdictional control. A forum non conveniens denial would not guarantee a trial in the original forum; for after the denial to
dismiss, sister forums might compel a relocation of the action either in the
interest of convenience or for the sake of forcing a change of law.
As an alternative to extending the present rules of fullfaith and credit, the
general adoption of the doctrine of forum non conveniens would create an
effective method of transferring actions to or from any jurisdiction. Like injunctions assured of recognition, the comparatively simple remedy of the discretionary dismissal could effectively relieve any defendant situated in an
inappropriate forum. Yet unlike a system of transfer based on the mandatory

recognition of injunctions, a system grounded in voluntary forum participation would not entail a qualification of forum autonomy. Dismissals would be
discretionary, not compelled by the Constitution; and the relationship between the forums participating in the transfer would be a relationship of cooperation, not control.
If the states should uniformly adopt the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 45 the rationale for full faith and credit recognition of injunctions
45 States have rejected the doctrine of forum non conveniens on the bases of (1) state
statutory policy, (2) federal constitutional law and (3) the undesirability of the policy. In
Alabama, Missouri, and Texas, transfers of actions to other states have been denied on
interpretations of local statutes permitting the litigation of claims based on incidents occurring outside the state. Exparte State ex rel. Southern Ry., 254 Ala. 10, 47 So.2d 249 (1950);
State ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 362 Mo. 101, 240 S.W.2d 106 (1951); State ex rel.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 155, 143 S.W. 483 (1911); Allen v. Bass, 47
S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1932). In Mattone v. Argentina, 123 Ohio St. 393, 175 N.E.
603 (1931), the Ohio court regarded the doctrine of forum non conveniens as incompatible
with the "statutory and constitutional provisions of the state." Id.at 398, 175 N.E. at 605.
However, the statute adverted to in the decision, OHIo GENERA& CODE § 11276, defines the
extent of permissible, not mandatory, jurisdiction.
In a second class of cases, the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CoNsr.art. IV, § 2,
has been the basis of refusals to vest trial courts with the power to grant discretionary dismissals. Access to the courts of the state has been thought to be a privilege of state citizenship: by interpretation of the constitutional command, the privilege has been extended to
noncitizens as well as citizens. Bourestrom v. Bourestrom, 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426
(1939); Herrmann v. Franklin Ice Cream Co., 114 Nebr. 468, 208 N.W. 141 (1926). The
Supreme Court in Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1927), held that a
forum non conveniens policy based on residence does not contravene the privileges and immunities clause. See note 20 supra.
Recently, Washington has rejected the doctrine of forum non conveniens solely on the
ground that a transfer remedy appeared to be neither desirable nor necessary. Lansverk
v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wash.2d 124, 338 P.2d 747 (1959).
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would be substantially undercut. If, however, the continued application of
rigid residence limitations prevented a significant number of inconvenienced
defendants from obtaining discretionary dismissals, a nonrestricted system of
transfer based on mandatory recognition of injunctions would remain an
attractive alternative. In large part the desirability of extending full faith and
credit recognition to injunctions depends on state initiative in expanding the
use of forum non conveniiens. If the states are recalcitrant, the application of
the full faith and credit clause may be necessary to assure relief for every
defendant unduly inconvenienced by his adversary's choice of forum.

